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This paper develops a theory of multiple unit auctions with short squeezes in the post- 
auction market. This is especially relevant for financial and commodity markets where 
players may enter the auction with established forward positions. We study how a 
potential short squeeze impacts on bidders' strategies and auction performance. 
Conversely, we also study how the design of the auction affects the incidence of short 
squeezes. In particular, we model both uniform price and discriminatory price auctions 
in a true multiple unit setting, where bidders can submit multiple bids for multiple units. 
Our model is cast in what appears to be a common value framework. However, we 
show that the possibility of a short squeeze introduces different valuations of the to-be-
auctioned asset between short and long bidders. Equilibrium bidding strategies depend 
on pre-auction allocations and the size of the auction. Short squeezes are more likely to 
happen after discriminatory auctions than after uniform auctions, ceteris paribus. 
Discriminatory auctions therefore lead to (1) more price distortion; (2) higher revenue 
for an auctioneer; (3) more volatility in the secondary market. This shows that a central 
bank or sovereign treasury, say, may face a tradeoff between revenue maximization and 
market distortions when choosing the design of repo or treasury auctions. The 
probability of a short squeeze following a discriminatory auction tends to decrease with 
the auction size, increase with the market power of the largest long bidders, and 
decrease with small long players' scope for free-riding on a short squeeze. 
Asymptotically, as the auction size becomes arbitrarily large, the two types of auctions 
lead to equivalent outcomes. 
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The problem of how to organize the sale of many identical units is often solved in practice
by holding an auction where bidders can submit multiple bids for multiple units. Such
auctions are important, not least because the auctioned assets often play prominent roles
in the wider economy. Examples include auctions of treasury securities, electricity, gold,
and money. The scale of these auctions and the frequency with which they are held add to
their importance. The feature of these auctions that we focus on in this paper arises from
the fact that in practice bidders often have established forward positions in the underlying
asset before the auction is actually held. Players that are short must cover their positions
either by buying in the auction or the post-auction market. The risk of leaving it to the
post-auction market lies in the chance that a few bidders buy so much of the underlying
asset in the auction that they obtain market power in the secondary market. This power
can be used to ask exorbitant prices when short players come to buy, i.e., to implement
a short squeeze. This is known as the loser’s nightmare (Simon, 1994). In this paper,
we contribute to the theory of multiple unit auctions by showing how a potential short
squeeze impacts on bidders’ strategies and auction performance. We model the two most
commonly used multiple unit auction formats, namely uniform price and discriminatory
price auctions.
To get a perspective on the importance of the problem we are studying, in 2000 the US
Treasury held 145 treasury auctions with a total nominal value of $2.1 trillion. Moreover,
primary dealers (who must bid in the auctions) often enter these auctions with substantial
short positions as a result of pre-auction demand for the to-be-issued security by pension
funds and other institutions [Joint Report (1992), Bikhchandani and Huang (1993), Si-
mon (1994), Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996)]. Empirical evidence by Sundaresan (1994)
suggests that short squeezing is a regular feature of this market. Direct evidence where
a primary dealer bought most of the auction and subsequently squeezed the shorts is
provided by the notorious Salomon squeeze:1
...the two-year notes became so scarce that the dealers who owned the notes charged
exorbitant fees and ﬂnancing costs when lending them to short-sellers. From small
bond arbitrage operations in Chicago to the New York powerhouses, bond traders
across America were badly burned. ‘The arbs were hurt the worst; several of the
smaller shops went out of business.’...The pain was so severe and the cries of foul
play so loud that the two-year note squeeze became the talk of the bond market for
weeks. (Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1991)
While this auction was discriminatory, since October 1998 all US Treasury auctions have
been uniform.
Another important example of multiple unit auctions is repo auctions, which are used,
for instance, by the European Central Bank (ECB) to channel euro denominated liquidity
into the banking sector. ECB repo auctions are held every week and the typical size
1See the Joint Report on the Government Securities Market (1992). Jegadeesh (1993) and Jordan and
Jordan (1996) provide further discussion.
1is around 100 billion euros. Since July 2000, they have been discriminatory.2 In these
auctions, ﬂnancial institutions submit bids for how much they would like to borrow from
the central bank at a given interest rate. The maturity of the loan is announced by the
central bank in advance. In return for the funds, the ﬂnancial institution hands over
collateral to the central bank, which is returned when the loan is repaid. Some banks
participating in repo auctions have a liquidity shortfall, perhaps as a result of their normal
day to day activities. If these banks do not manage to cover their liquidity shortfall in the
auction, they must borrow in the interbank market, often on an overnight basis. That a
squeeze on liquidity can occur is suggested by the spikes observed in interbank rates around
the end of the reserve maintenance period (see Hartmann, Manna, and Manzanares (2001)
for European evidence and Hamilton (1996) for US evidence).
The possibility of a short squeeze in the post-auction market has importance for bidders
in the auction as well as for the seller. From a short bidder’s perspective, an important
question is how to bid to avoid being squeezed. Similarly, a long bidder is interested in
how to bid in order to implement a squeeze, or potentially free-ride oﬁ somebody else who
will implement a squeeze. From a seller’s perspective, revenue may be larger when the
chance of a squeeze is larger, since this is likely to involve more aggressive bidding. Hence,
a seller may view an auction procedure which promotes squeezing as desirable. However,
a short squeeze also means that prices (or interest rates) are being distorted away from
their competitive levels and experience higher volatility. This may be undesirable for many
sellers such as sovereign treasuries and central banks. For example, the US Treasury has
expressed a low award concentration as an auction objective and, to that end, do not allow
individual dealers to buy more than 35% in the auction.3 Whatever the seller’s objective
may be, it is important to establish the extent to which short squeezing and price distortion
depend upon the auction format, size of the auction, pre-auction allocations and to what
extent this is related to the seller’s revenue.
To address these issues, we develop a model where a multiple unit auction of a homo-
geneous asset is followed by post-auction trading. Moreover, at the time of the auction,
bidders may already have long or short positions in the to-be-auctioned asset. Since our
aim is to focus on the interaction between strategic behavior in the post-auction market
and the auction itself, pre-auction allocations are exogenously given. Short squeezing may
happen in the post-auction market if some bidders are so large that they have market
power. In both uniform and discriminatory auctions, bidders compete by simultaneously
submitting collections of bids. Since the model is cast in the context of borrowing (or
repos), individual bids consist of a quantity that the bidder wishes to borrow and an inter-
est rate. But our analysis and results apply equally and in full to treasury auctions and,
2Until June 2000, the ECB used to conduct repo auctions as ﬂxed rate tenders. The interaction between
short squeezing in the interbank market and bidder behavior in ﬂxed rate tenders has been studied by
Nyborg and Strebulaev (2001).
3The 35% rule takes into account bidders’ when-issued positions. As illustrated by the Salomon scandal,
the US Treasury will punish dealers that attempt to get around this rule. The Joint Report (p.C-7) informs
us that Salomon was prohibited from bidding in US Treasury auctions on behalf of its customers for an
indeterminate time. Additionally, Salomon was ﬂned nearly $300 million (Sundaresan, 1997, p.72). In
treasury auctions in other countries, e.g. Sweden, there are no such limits and indeed it happens from
time to time that a single bidder buys the entire auction (Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundaresan, 2001).
2more generally, to security or commodity auctions where players buy the underlying asset
outright and bids are price-quantity pairs. In both uniform and discriminatory auctions,
the bids with the largest interest rates are hit ﬂrst, until supply is exhausted. The diﬁer-
ence between the two auction formats lies in the rate that is paid. In uniform auctions, all
bidders pay the same \market clearing" rate; whereas in discriminatory auctions, bidders
must pay the rate that they bid. This corresponds to how these types of auctions work in
practice.
Our ﬂrst ﬂnding deals with the valuation of the auctioned assets. In principle, our
model is cast in a common value setting since in the absence of a squeeze, the competitive
rate (or price) will prevail in the secondary market. However, we show that the possibility
of a squeeze introduces a fundamental asymmetry between short and long bidders as well
as between diﬁerent types of long players, which means that they value the auctioned
assets diﬁerently. In particular, short bidders tend to have downward sloping valuation
schedules; whereas large long players tend to have upward sloping valuation schedules.
Small long players tend to have ￿at valuation schedules. These diﬁerences in valuations
across bidders as well as the varying marginal valuations for a single bidder has important
consequences for equilibrium bidding strategies.
We ﬂnd that, in equilibrium, short squeezes are more likely after discriminatory auc-
tions than after uniform auctions. As a result, discriminatory auctions lead to more
secondary market distortions, meaning deviations from the competitive rate (or price), in
both the auction itself and in the secondary market. Another consequence is that volatility
in the secondary market tends to be larger after discriminatory auctions. This is consistent
with the empirical ﬂndings of Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) in a study of the US exper-
iment with uniform versus discriminatory price auctions in the 1990’s. Finally, expected
revenue is larger in discriminatory auctions than in uniform auctions.4
These results are driven only by the eﬁect of a potential short squeeze. We do not
consider the relative merits of uniform versus discriminatory auctions on other dimensions
such as the winner’s curse (see, e.g., Milgrom and Weber, 1982) or the extent to which they
may lead to monopsonistic market power among bidders [Wilson (1979), Kyle (1989), Back
and Zender (1993)]. Our paper draws on the literature on short squeezing, particularly on
Dunn and Spatt (1984) and Cooper and Donaldson (1998). However, our main emphasis is
on multiple unit auctions, and we are not familiar with any other model which examines the
impact of a potential short squeeze on equilibrium in auctions where bidders can submit
multiple bids for multiple units. Perhaps the most related work to ours is Chatterjea
and Jarrow (1998), who model a pre-auction forward market, a single bid auction, and
a post-auction market in which a short squeeze may occur.5 However, our paper diﬁers
4With respect to auction revenue, one take on the empirical evidence, e.g. as presented by Nyborg
and Sundaresan (1996), on the performance of US Treasury auctions suggests that uniform auctions have
larger revenue than discriminatory auctions. This is based on looking at the \markup" (the diﬁerence
between the auction and when-issued rates before the auction). However, as pointed out by Nyborg
and Sundaresan, one must interpret this diﬁerence with caution since, if a squeeze is more likely with a
discriminatory auction, the \squeeze premium" is likely to be both in the auction rate and the when-issued
rate. Hence revenue may be larger under discriminatory auctions even though the markup is larger.
5Other models of market cornering and short squeezing include Kyle (1984), Jarrow (1992 and 1994)
and Kumar and Seppi (1992). These papers do not model auctions. Models of treasury auctions with
3substantially from theirs on several important dimensions. For example, (i) we model
true multiple unit auctions, (ii) there can be any number of strategic players, and (iii)
all players can participate in the auction regardless of their pre-auction position in the
underlying asset. While Chatterjea and Jarrow study the case that a dealer attempts to
squeeze a short player who cannot participate in the auction, we study how short and long
players compete in the auction in the face of a potential short squeeze,w h i c hi st h em o s t
relevant scenario in many contexts. For example, in US Treasury auctions, many primary
dealers are often short in the when-issued market and are also the main participants in
the auction (Joint Report, 1992).
An important issue which is raised in the short squeezing literature is the extent to
which \small" long players are able to free-ride on a short squeeze by a \large" long player.
For example, Kyle (1984) posits that small long players would be able to sell all their units
well above the competitive price before the short squeezer would be able to sell any units.
This is formalized and generalized by Cooper and Donaldson (1998) to the case that all
players are strategic. The ability of smaller players to free-ride on a squeeze is also well
recognized by traders that we have talked to. This is related to the well known point, when
there are positive externalities, that smaller players can do better (on a per unit basis)
than larger players, because the latter will often internalize the externality [Olsen and
Zechkauser (1966), Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986)].6 A famous example from the
ﬂnance literature is the ability of small shareholders to free-ride on the monitoring eﬁorts
of a large shareholder (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). However, using a similar framework to
Cooper and Donaldson, Dunn and Spatt (1984) provides a short squeezing model without
free-riding. The contrast arises because of diﬁerences in the market microstructures. This
raises an important question; namely, how bidding in the auction is aﬁected by diﬁerent
scopes for free-riding. To study this, we employ a generalized short squeezing model
which nests the models of Dunn and Spatt and Cooper and Donaldson as special cases.
Surprisingly, we ﬂnd that the main qualitative features of equilibrium in the auction are
not sensitive to the scope for free-riding. However, the equilibrium probability of a short
squeeze is decreasing in the scope for free-riding.
Since we explicitly characterize equilibria in both discriminatory and uniform auctions
under any pre-auction allocation and any auction size, we are able to derive empirical
predictions regarding various features of equilibrium bidding strategies. In particular, we
ﬂnd that in uniform auctions, the threat of a short squeeze tends to induce short players
to submit collections of bids with a higher mean rate (or price) and more dispersion than
long bidders. While there are pure strategy equilibria for uniform auctions, only mixed
strategy equilibria exist for discriminatory auctions, where players randomize over bids.
In these equilibria, short bidders tend to submit collection of bids with a higher expected
mean rate (or price) than long bidders.
Another feature of equilibrium is that most long players are not active in the auction.
either a when-issued or a resale market include Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) and Viswanathan and
Wang (2000). These papers do not consider short squeezes. For a recent survey on auction theory, see
Klemperer (1999).
6Olsen and Zeckhauser (1966), for example, attribute the disproportionately large share of GDP spent
on defense among larger NATO allies to this point.
4The roots of this result can be found in the diﬁerent valuations of the shorts and longs.
Since shorts value the ﬂrst few units higher than the longs, they bid so aggressively for
these units that most longs do not ﬂnd it worthwhile to try to compete. This extreme
behavior is quite surprising, particularly when the scope for free-riding is large, since a
small long player would not lose his ability to free-ride in the secondary market if he were
to buy a small amount in the auction.
Finally, under discriminatory auctions, the equilibrium probability of a short squeeze
tends to decrease in the auction size, increase with the market power of the largest long
players, and decrease with the scope for free-riding, ceteris paribus. As a result, price
distortion, post-auction volatility, and revenue (per unit sold) tend to be smaller when
the auction size is large (or market power is small). We also show that asymptotically
discriminatory and uniform auctions are equivalent in that their outcomes converge to
each other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
analyzes the auction model when there are only two bidders. Section 4 generalizes and
expands these results to any number of long bidders. This section also investigates the
impact of the scope for free-riding on a squeeze. Section 5 draws out empirical predictions
from the equilibria in Section 4. Section 6 discusses extensions to the model and Section 7
concludes. The appendix contains proofs not supplied in the text.
2 The Model
We construct a three date model where at date 1 there is a multiple unit auction, at
date 2 there is trading in a secondary market, and at date 3 trades are settled and payoﬁs
are collected. There are N players with initial positions in an underlying asset of Y 0 =
fyn;0gN
n=1 2Z n,w h e r eZ denotes the set of integers. Initial allocations of individual players
can be negative as well as positive. However, the total initial supply, Q0 =
PN
n=1yn;0 is non-
negative.7 Initial allocations are common knowledge. We refer to players with negative
(positive) positions as short (long).
We will think of the underlying asset as being money, and players with negative initial
positions must reﬂnance the loans that these positions represent by obtaining the required
funds either by borrowing in the auction at date 1 or in the secondary market at date 2. All
loans made at these two dates mature at date 3. The auction is held by an agency that does
not participate actively in the game. This agency can be thought of as the central bank
(or treasury), and the N primary players can be thought of as commercial (or investment)
banks. One could equally think of the underlying asset as being a commodity or security
7The assumption that Q0 ‚ 0 is realistic, but not essential. Q0 < 0 would mean that some units of the
physical underlying asset or long forward contracts on it would be held by players outside the model (see
Section 6). The assumption that initial allocations are integer quantities corresponds to the fact that,
in multiple unit auctions in practice, there is usually a quantity multiple. For example, in US Treasury
auctions, individual bids must be for quantities in increments of $1,000 nominal. In ECB repo auctions,
the quantity multiple is 0.1 million Euros. In addition to being realistic, this discreteness assumption
means that the type of underpricing equilibria in the uniform auction studied by Wilson (1979) and Back
and Zender (1993) does not exist in our model (see Nyborg, 2001).
5a n dt h ea u c t i o na sb e i n gareverse repo auction of the asset. In this case, players would
be bidding to borrow the commodity until date 3.8
For the purpose of describing a player’s objective function, denote the award to the
nth bank in the auction by yn;1 and the quantity weighted average interest rate that the
bank must pay on this amount by an;1.L e t yn;2 = yn;0 + yn;1 denote a bank’s holdings
at the beginning of date 2. Banks with yn;2 < 0 must b o r r o wa td a t e2t oc o v e rt h e i r
short positions. This opens up the possibility of short squeezing.9 Denote the quantity
weighted average interest at which the nth bank lends or borrows at date 2 by an;2.T h u s ,
the total interest earnings or payments to bank n at date 3 are
…n = an;2yn;0 +( an;2 ¡ an;1)yn;1; (1)
where all variables except yn;0 will be determined endogenously in equilibrium. The ob-
jective of a player is to maximize …n.10
Date 1: Uniform and Discriminatory Auctions
T h es i z eo ft h ea u c t i o ni sQ 2Z +. A bidder can make any number of bids such that the
total quantity he demands is less than or equal to Q. An individual bid is an ordered
pair (r; q) 2 [Rl;1) £ −, specifying an interest rate and a quantity, respectively, where
− = f1;:::;Qg and Rl represents the central bank’s reservation rate.
Denote the set of bids submitted by player n by
bn = f(rn;i;q n;i)g
m(n)
i=1 ; (2)
where m(n) is the total number of bids submitted by the player. For the purpose of
detailing the pricing and allocation rules in the two auction mechanisms, these bids can
be ordered into a demand function xn(r)=
Pm(n)
i=1 qn;i1[rn;i‚r], which is a left continuous,
decreasing step function. The aggregate demand schedule is X(r)=
PN
n=1 xn(r). The stop
out rate, rs, is the highest rate at which supply is exhausted (or Rl if no such rate exists).
Speciﬂcally, since X(r) is a left continuous step function,
rs =
(
maxfrjX(r) ‚ Qg if frjX(r) ‚ Qg6 = ;g
Rl otherwise.
The auctioned supply is allocated to the highest bids. This means that bids above the
stop-out rate are awarded in full, while bids at the stop-out rate are rationed (pro rata).
To formalize this, let dxn(rs) be the marginal demand of player n at the rate rs and let
8If the security or commodity were purchased outright instead of through a repo, algebraically and
economically, the model and the results would be unaﬁected (see footnotes 9 and 10). In the context of
when-issued markets and treasury auctions, date 2 would represent the issue date.
9 In the case that the underlying asset is a security or commodity, short squeezing requires that the
asset is unique in the sense that it is impossible to cover short positions by close substitutes. For example,
in US Treasury when-issued markets, only securities with particular CUSIPs can serve this function.
10 In the case that the underlying asset is a security or commodity and is purchased outright instead of
borrowed through a reverse repo, the objective function (1) can also be interpreted in terms of prices. In
this case, an;t would be a quantity weighted average price.
6xn(r+

















The diﬁerence between uniform and discriminatory auctions lies in the rate that win-
ning bidders must pay. In a uniform auction, all winning bidders pay the stop-out rate;
while in a discriminatory auction, winning bidders pay what they bid. Hence, for uniform
auctions, the interest costs on the winning bids of the nth bank will be
interest in uniform auction = an;1yn;1 = rsyn;1:
For discriminatory auctions, the nth bank’s interest costs is the sum of the interest on its
winning bids, that is,
interest in discriminatory auction = an;1yn;1 =
m(n) X
i=1
qn;irn;i1[rn;i>rs] +[ yn;1 ¡ xn(r
+
s )]rs:
Hence for discriminatory auctions an;1 can be larger than the stop-out rate.
Date 2: The Secondary Market and Short Squeezing
Although the primary focus of our analysis is on the auction itself, what makes this
new and interesting is the possibility of short squeezing in the secondary market. To
model this, we employ a reduced form representation which nests the models of Dunn
and Spatt (1984) and Cooper and Donaldson (1998) as special cases. These models share
a common framework which, for our purposes, has two important features; namely, all
players are strategic and multiple players can have su–cient market power to implement
a short squeeze. In our context, this framework can be described as follows:
Date 2 starts with longs making oﬁers to shorts to lend the underlying asset for one
period (until date 3). Shorts also have the outside option of borrowing from the central
bank, say, at Rh. This rate therefore caps what a long player can earn from a squeeze.
After shorts have reﬂnanced, longs can lend any remaining units of the underlying asset,
perhaps to retail clients, at the competitive rate of R0 2 [Rl;R h).12 There is a short
squeeze in equilibrium if and only if some player has market (monopoly) power, which
using our notation is deﬂned as follows:
Deﬂnition 1 Let N denotes the set of all N players. For t 2f 0;2g,t h emarket power









11 Formally, (i) xn(r+
s )=
Pm(n)
i=1 qn;i1[rn;i>rs],a n d( i i )dxn(rs)=
Pm(n)
i=1 qn;i1[rn;i=rs],s odxn(rs)=0i f
bidder n places no bids at rs.
12In the contexts of money markets, Rh would represent the central bank’s lending standing facility. In
most countries or currency areas, the competitive rate is typically straddled by the lending and deposit
standing facilities of the central bank. More generally, Rh could represent a rate between the competitive
rate and the lending standing facility, perhaps determined by bargaining. In other contexts, Rh would
represent the price of the \fancy good" (see, e.g., Salant (1984)). In treasury auctions Rh would be
determined by the penalty from failing to deliver on a trade from the when-issued market. This penalty
may diﬁer between countries.
7This says that at date 2, the market power of the nth bank is the units of the underlying
asset held by that bank which the shorts need to cover their positions and cannot obtain
elsewhere (without using the outside option). Shorts and \small" longs have no market
power. If no player has market power, all units trade at the competitive rate of R0.
However, if a player has market power over z units, he can lend these units at Rh.
The question that remains is: In the case of a short squeeze, what is the transaction
rate for those units that shorts need to cover and over which no player has monopoly
power? As it turns out, there is no consensus answer in the literature. In Dunn and
Spatt (1984), the equilibrium transaction rate on these units is R0.I nc o n t r a s t ,i nC o o p e r
and Donaldson (1998), when there is a unique largest long player, all other longs are able
to lend all their units at Rh, as suggested by Kyle (1984). In other words, in equilibrium
small players free-ride on the squeeze of a large long player, and shorts get squeezed on
all units they need to cover. The diﬁerent conclusions reached by these papers is due to
diﬁerences in trading mechanisms. The general point seems to be that the extent to which
\small" longs are able to free-ride on a squeeze depends on how the market is organized.
To study the impact of diﬁerent levels of free-riding, we introduce – 2 [0;1] as a measure
of the scope for free-riding,w h e r e– = 0 denotes no free-riding opportunities (Dunn and
Spatt) and – = 1 denotes full free-riding opportunities (Cooper and Donaldson). Now,
there are three types of longs at date 2. First, there are the small longs, who have zero
market power. Second, there are the intermediate longs, who have positive market power
but not the largest. Third, there are the X largest longs who have the largest positive
market power. We denote these by L0, L1,a n dL2, respectively. If no player has market
power, X =0a n dL1 and L2 are empty. Given the history of the game up to date 2,





[R0 + –1[X‚1](Rh ¡ R0)]yn;2 ¡ an;1yn;1 if n 2 L0
Rhzn;2 +[ R0 + –(Rh ¡ R0)][yn;2 ¡ zn;2] ¡ an;1yn;1 if n 2 L1
Rhzn;2 + R0(yn;2 ¡ zn;2) ¡ an;1yn;1 if n 2 L2.
(5)
Notice that when – is relatively large, small and intermediate longs do better on a per unit
basis than the largest longs and, in some cases, may even do better in absolute terms.
The aggregate payoﬁ to the shorts is determined by (5) and the fact that the total
gross payoﬁ to all players (payoﬁ net of interest to be paid from units obtained in the
auction) is









2 jyn;2j,a n dw h e r eN
+
t = fijyi;t ‚ 0g denotes the set
of long players and N
¡
t = fijyi;t < 0g denotes the set of short players at date t.D e ﬂ n e
13In their analysis, Cooper and Donaldson consider only the case that there is at most one player with
market power. A proof that the general case (when many longs have market power) yields payoﬁs as stated
in (5) with – = 1 is available from the current authors upon request. Note that we are focusing on their
\endgame/delivery process," since, for our purposes, the dynamic aspects of their model is of secondary
importance. Dunn and Spatt’s model is only developed for one short. However, the general point is that
there may be a trading mechanism which delivers the competitive price on those units over which players
do not have monopoly power. In a more standard, non-squeeze setting, Allen and Hellwig (1986) have
shown in a model where capacity constrained sellers choose prices as strategies, that the equilibrium price
converges in distribution to the competitive price as the number of sellers increases.
8Y0 =
P
n2L0 yn;2, Y1 =
P
n2L1(yn;2 ¡ zn;2), and ZL =
P
n2N +
2 zn;2. By subtracting from (6)
the gross payoﬁs to the various long players using (5) and adding the shorts’ interest costs









The ﬂrst term in (7) represents the squeeze itself on ZL units. The second term is what
the shorts would pay to cover the remaining units that they are short, if there were no
free-riding. The third term represents the free-riding. This says that the number of units
that no player has market power over and on which the shorts pay the squeeze premium,
Rh ¡ R0,i se q u a lt oY0 + Y1. In other words, it is equal to the sum of the positions of all
small longs and the sum of the positions of all intermediate longs in excess of their market
power.
Finally, notice that (4) also deﬂnes market power at date 0. This is essentially what
date 2 market power would be if no units were auctioned at date 1. To retain his entire
date 0 market power, a long player will need to buy all units in the auction. To guarantee
that no player will have market power at date 2, it is su–cient for the shorts to buy a
total of
Z · maxfzn;0jn 2Ng
units in the auction. This parameter will play a central role in the auction analysis.
3 The Auction: Equilibrium with Two Players
By studying the model with only two players, one short and one long, we are able to
draw out some of the important diﬁerences between uniform and discriminatory auctions
while maintaining a fairly simple modeling structure. The additional complexities raised
by having more than two long players are studied in subsequent sections.
As a benchmark, observe that if both players have long positions initially, the auction
rate is R0. In equilibrium under either auction format, both banks submit bids for Q units
at a rate of R0. Therefore, in this section, we study the more interesting case that one
player is short and the other is long. Let y1;0 < 0a n dy2;0 = Q0 ¡ y1;0 > 0. Hereafter we
will refer to Player 1 as \the short (player)" and to Player 2 as \the long (player)". Since
there are only two players, the market power of the long player at date 0 is Z = ¡y1;0.
For a given outcome in the auction, fy1;1;y 2;1;a 1;1;a 2;1g, equations (5) and (7) tell us
that trading in the secondary market will yield the following date 3 payoﬁs:
…n =
(
y1;2R0 ¡ z2;2(Rh ¡ R0) ¡ a1;1y1;1 if n =1 .
y2;2R0 + z2;2(Rh ¡ R0) ¡ a2;1y2;1 if n =2 .
(8)
14 In deriving (7), we have used the following implications of the deﬂnition of market power: (i) for
any player with market power at date 2, yn;2 ¡ zn;2 = YL ¡ YS;a n d( i i )ZL = YL ¡Y0 +jL2j(YS ¡YL)+
jL1j(YS ¡YL), where jL1j is the number of intermediate longs. Note also that (ii) implies that for X ‚ 1,
Y1 + Y0 = YS ¡ ZL ¡ (X ¡ 1)(YL ¡ YS). This shows that the aggregate payoﬁ to the shorts at date 2 is
increasing in X when –>0, ceteris paribus. This is a feature of Cooper and Donaldson’s model. Details
are available from the current authors upon request.
9w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dz2;2 =m a x [ 0 ;¡y1;2]. The expression for …2 can be rewritten as
R0y2;0 +(Rh ¡R0)z2;2 ¡(a2;1 ¡R0)y2;1, which shows that Player 2 faces a potential price-
quantity tradeoﬁ in the auction from squeezing in the secondary market: he gains Rh¡R0
for each unit of market power he has at date 2, but loses a2;1¡R0 for each unit purchased
in the auction. A similar tradeoﬁ is seen in the expression for …1.
We refer to an auction as small if Q • Z. In this case, there will always be a short
squeeze at date 2 under any auction format, since the auction does not oﬁer the chance for
the short player to cover his position. In this section, we focus on the more interesting case
that the auction is large in the sense that Q>Z ,w h i c hw eb e l i e v ei st h em o s tr e l e v a n t
scenario in practice. In this case, the short can cover in the auction, if he bids su–ciently
aggressively. As a result, it is not a foregone conclusion that there will be a squeeze.
3.1 Private Valuations in Large Auctions
The setting in our paper is seemingly common value since, in the absence of a short
squeeze, the prevailing rate is R0 for all units. Moreover, in the event of a squeeze the
extra interest paid by a short bank goes directly to a long bank. However, we show here
that there is a simple but fundamental asymmetry between short and long players which
leads them to value the auctioned units diﬁerently.
To illustrate the diﬁerence in valuations, we ask the following question: how much
is Player n willing to pay to obtain an additional unit in the auction, keeping the total
number of units in the auction ﬂxed at Q>Z . We refer to the schedule of these net
marginal valuations as the player’s valuation schedule, Vn.T h u s Vn(q)=a⁄
n;2(q)(yn;0 +
q) ¡ a⁄
n;2(q ¡ 1)(yn;0 + q ¡ 1), where a⁄
n;2(q) is the date 2 equilibrium quantity weighted
average rate at which the nth player lends or borrows his yn;0 + q units.
Proposition 1 The valuation schedules of the auctioned units of the two players are dif-
ferent. In particular, the short has a decreasing valuation schedule, and the long has an
increasing valuation schedule.
Proof: To avoid being squeezed, the short needs to win only Z units in the auction. Since
any additional units that the short wins can be lent at R0, the short values the ﬂrst Z
u n i t sh ew i n si nt h ea u c t i o na tRh and the last Q¡Z units at R0. The long needs to win
Q¡Z +1 units in the auction in order to implement a squeeze. Therefore, the long values
the ﬂrst Q ¡ Z units he wins in the auction at R0 and the last Z units at Rh. 2
This illustrates the fundamental result that the possibility of short squeezing in the
secondary market can give rise to diﬁerential valuations in the primary market in a seem-
ingly common value setting. This breakdown of a common valuation, both across and
within bidders’ valuation schedules, impacts profoundly on our analysis and is the reason
why, as we shall see, uniform and discriminatory auctions lead to diﬁerent outcomes.
The idea that a potential short squeeze can give rise to private valuations in multi-unit
auctions was ﬂrst suggested by Sundaresan (1994). Our setting is diﬁerent from the private
values model studied by Vickrey (1961) and others in that: (i) in our model, shorts have
decreasing valuations schedules while longs tend to have increasing valuation schedules,
10and (ii) these valuation schedules are consequences of equilibrium in the secondary market
and are not independent of each other.
Coming back to the valuation of the long, we see that the most he would be willing to
pay for Q units in the auction is (per unit)
„ RQZ ·
(Q ¡ Z)R0 + ZRh
Q
<R h: (9)
„ RQZ is the quantity weighted average interest rate the long would earn on the Q auctioned
units, if he were to win them all. This average, or break-even, value turns out to be an
important parameter in the auction analysis.
3.2 Large Uniform Auctions
Recall that a pure strategy for Player n in the auction speciﬂes a set of bids, as represented
by (2) with
Pm(n)
i=1 qn;i • Q, as a function of the player’s initial allocation. The equilibrium
concept is Nash equilibrium in either pure or mixed strategies.
Theorem 1 In uniform auctions, it is equilibrium for Player 2 to submit b
u
2 = f(R0;Q)g
and for Player 1 to submit b
u
1 = f(Rh;Z);(R0;Q¡ Z)g. The outcome of this equilibrium,
which is also the unique equilibrium outcome, is as follows: First, the revenue to the
seller is QR0 and the stop-out rate is R0. Second, payoﬁs to the two players are given by
…n = yn;0R0, n =1 ;2. Third, there is no short squeeze in the secondary market.
Intuitively, the short is exploiting the diﬁerential valuations by bidding for the units he
needs to cover at a very high price. Faced with this, the long can do no better than
being passive (placing no bids above R0). Thus, there is no cost to the short from bidding
so aggressively since he only pays the stop-out rate for all units he wins. Hence, the
combination of diﬁerential valuations and uniform price eliminates short squeezing. As
a consequence, all units in the auction are sold at the competitive rate, and there is no
interest rate distortions or excess volatility in the secondary market.
3.3 Large Discriminatory Auctions
The analysis for discriminatory auctions is more complicated because there is no equilib-
rium in pure strategies. This is more than a technical result. It also implies that in any
equilibrium, there is a positive probability of a post-auction short squeeze.
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium in pure strategies in discriminatory auctions.
This is a consequence of the diﬁerent marginal valuations outlined above and the fact that
bidders in discriminatory auctions pay what they bid. To see this, suppose for example
that the short submits bids for Z units at Rh and Q ¡ Z units at R0,a sh ed o e si nt h e
uniform auction. The best response for the long would be to submit a bid for Q units,
say, at R0. But then the short could do better by demanding Z units at a rate marginally
above R0, to avoid being squeezed. But then the long could improve by bidding more
aggressively, etc.
11Theorem 2 In discriminatory auctions, the following is an equilibrium:
(i) The short submits b
⁄
1 = f(~ S;Z);(R0;Q¡ Z)g,w h e r e~ S is a random variable with







(ii) The long submits b
⁄
2 = f(~ L;Q)g,w h e r e~ L is a random variable with realization L,







Rh ¡ „ RQZ
Rh ¡ L
: (11)
The ﬂrst part of the proof is interesting because it shows how F(S)a n dG(L)a r ec o n -
structed, and we therefore include it here (the second part is in the appendix).
Proof: We need to show that b⁄
1 and b⁄
2 are best replies to each other. Observe ﬂrst that under
these strategies, each player demands Q units at a price of R0 or higher with probability one.
Therefore, since the short values the ﬂrst Z units at Rh and the last Q¡Z units at R0,h ec a n n o t
do better than letting one of his bids be (R0;Q¡ Z). Furthermore, neither bidder can improve
on his payoﬁ by deviating from the proposed equilibrium by submitting a bid where the rate has
a positive probability of being below R0.
Observe next that the proposed F(S) has no mass points. Therefore, under the proposed
strategies, either the long will win Q units and squeeze on Z units, or he will win fewer than Q
units and squeeze on no units. In the former case, the payoﬁ to the long is …L =( Q ¡ Z)R0 +
ZRh ¡ QL ‚ 0 if and only if L • „ RQZ,b yd e ﬂ n i t i o no f „ RQZ. Hence, the long cannot do better
than having G(„ RQZ) = 1. Furthermore, since the proposed G(L) does not have a mass point at
„ RQZ, the short cannot do better than having F( „ RQZ) = 1. Hence, neither bidder can improve
his payoﬁ by expanding the proposed supports of F(S)o rG(L).




(1 ¡ G(S))(¡ZRh)+G(S)(¡ZS)dF(S); (12)
and the long’s expected payoﬁ is
E[…L]=( y2;0 + Q ¡ Z)R0 +
Z
[R0; „ RQZ]
F(L)(ZRh ¡ QL)+( 1¡ F(L))(Z ¡ Q)LdG(L): (13)
For the proposed strategies to be equilibrium, it must be the case that the integrands of these
two expressions are independent of S and L, respectively. In particular, this means that the
long’s strategy must satisfy
(1 ¡ G(S))(¡ZRh)+G(S)(¡ZS)=C1; (14)
where C1 is a constant. Since G(„ RQZ)=1 ,i tf o l l o w st h a tC1 = ¡Z „ RQZ.F r o m t h i s ,a b i to f
algebra shows that G(L) as given by (11) is the unique solution to (14). Similarly, the short’s
strategy must satisfy
F(L)(ZRh ¡ QL)+( 1¡ F(L))(Z ¡ Q)L = C2; (15)
12where C2 is a constant. Since F(„ RQZ) = 1, it follows that C2 =( Z ¡ Q)R0,f r o mw h e r e
it is found that F(L) as given by (10) is the unique solution to (15). This establishes that
the proposed strategies constitute equilibrium, provided that the bidders cannot improve their
payoﬁs by splitting their bids further (see appendix). 2
In the discriminatory auction equilibrium described in Theorem 2, the short splits his
bid while the long submits a single bid. This parallels the result for uniform auctions.
As before, the intuition for why the short submits two bids derives from the fact that he
values the ﬂrst few units he needs to cover higher than the remaining auctioned units.
But in the discriminatory auction, the randomness of the short’s strategy aﬁords the long
with the opportunity to implement a short squeeze. The long takes advantage of this by
submitting a bid for the entire auction at a single rate which is above R0 with positive
probability. This re￿ects the facts that the long needs to buy all units to maximize the
size of the squeeze and his valuation schedule is increasing.
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution used by the short, F(S), and the long, G(L), for Z
and Q units, respectively. It is seen that F(S) ﬂrst order stochastically dominates G(L).
Intuitively, this happens because the short values the ﬂrst Z units higher on average than
the long values all Q units. Furthermore, in the event that there is no squeeze, the long
ends up buying Q ¡ Z units, which he values at only R0. As a response to this, the long
chooses G(L)t oh a v eam a s sp o i n ta tR0, as seen in the ﬂgure. In other words, the long
is aggressive (i.e., bids above R0)o n l yp a r to ft h et i m e .
The equilibrium in Theorem 2 is a member in the following class:
Deﬂnition 2 An equilibrium is a single-bid equilibrium if at least one player submits
only one bid (i.e., for some n, bn = f(~ rn; ~ qn)g,w h e r e~ rn and ~ qn are random variables).
This deﬂnition allows for both pure and mixed strategies. Single-bid equilibria are attrac-
tive because they are relatively simple. The equilibrium identiﬂed in the uniform auction
is also a single-bid equilibrium. Moreover, it is outcome unique. Here, we establish a
similar, but somewhat weaker result for the discriminatory auction.
Theorem 3 (Uniqueness) In discriminatory auctions, the equilibrium described in The-
orem 2 is the unique single-bid equilibrium.
In the equilibrium in Theorem 2, the mixed strategies of the short and the long have
support on [R0; „ RQZ], which is intuitive since „ RQZ is the average value to the long if
he wins all Q units. Theorem 3 establishes that there is no single-bid equilibrium with
diﬁerent support.
3.4 Market Entry in Large Auctions
In this subsection, we complete the analysis of large auctions with two players by asking
whether our results are robust to market entry. The equilibria we have identiﬂed above are
not aﬁected by bids from third parties as long as these bids are placed at R0.S ow ea s kt h e
question as to whether other players, who have zero initial allocations, are tempted to bid
aggressively in the auction if that were possible with zero transaction costs. By \bidding
aggressively" we mean placing bids in the auction above R0 with positive probability.





2g. It is not optimal for a player with no endowment to bid ag-
gressively in the auction (regardless of the scope for free-riding).
The intuition derives from the passive bidding of the long and the aggressive bidding of
the short for Z units, which means that a short squeeze cannot happen regardless of how
many units new entrants may obtain in the auction. For example, if new entrants buy the
entire auction, none of them nor Player 2 will have market power in the secondary market.
Proposition 3 Suppose the auction is discriminatory and the long and the short use the




2g. It is not optimal for a player with no
endowment to bid aggressively in the auction (regardless of the scope for free-riding).
It may seem more attractive for a potential new entrant to actually participate in a dis-
criminatory auction, as compared with a uniform auction, since he may be able to free-ride
on a squeeze. However, the proposition shows that even when the scope for free-riding is at
the maximum, the potential gains from this are too small compared with the cost of bid-
ding aggressively, winning a few units, and then not having a squeeze materialize because
the short managed to cover. The intuition relates to the aggressiveness of both the short
and the long, which is illustrated by the fact that the long’s equilibrium expected proﬂt
is y2;0R0; i.e., his eﬁorts to implement a short squeeze does not earn him any abnormal
returns (see the proof of Theorem 2). Furthermore, as discussed above, the short is even
more aggressive than the long.
4 Auction Equilibrium with Several Long Players
This section expands the analysis by considering the case that there are several long players.
We continue to assume that there is only one short player. Thus we address the question
as to what are the eﬁects of competition among potential short squeezers and what is the
impact of the scope for free-riding. For example, does the short player or the auctioneer
beneﬂt from competition among many longs? The answer is not obvious because an
individual long may bid passively in the auction, hoping to free-ride on somebody else’s
short squeezing eﬁorts.
We have N players, such that the ﬂrst is short and all others are long. Without loss of
generality, let y2;0 ‚ y3;0 ‚ :::‚ yN;0. The number of long players with positive market
p o w e ra td a t e0i sd e n o t e db yK.S oo n l yp l a y e r s2 ;:::;K+1 have market power initially.
We will be interested in longs with the largest market power: let there be M of them,
M • K,w i t hn u m b e r sn =2 ;:::;M +1 .
4.1 Valuation Schedules in Large Auctions with Many Longs
The basic message from the case of N = 2, that players with diﬁerent initial endowments
have diﬁerent valuation schedules, remains true in the more general case we are considering
here. However, the exact value of an additional unit to a player now depends upon how
14the remaining units are distributed among the other players. For example, the value to the
short from capturing a qth unit in the auction is: (i) Rh if he will be squeezed regardless
of whether he wins q ¡ 1o rq units; (ii) R0 if he will not be squeezed; or (iii) R ‚ Rh
if by winning this extra unit the short goes from being squeezed to not being squeezed.
To see this, suppose there are three players, initial allocations are f¡8;12;5g, Q =5 ,a n d
– = 1. If the short captures 2 units and the largest long captures 3 units, the short will be
squeezed on 6 units at date 2. Now if the short captures a third unit he goes from being
squeezed to not being squeezed and can borrow 5 units at date 2 at R0. Therefore, the
value to the short of the third unit in this case is R =6 Rh¡5R0 >R h. Which of the three
scenarios apply depends upon which players would get the remaining units. Thus it is now
impossible to unequivocally specify the short’s valuation schedule. However, because the
same fundamental forces are at work here as when N = 2, the short generally values the
ﬂrst few units higher than the last unit, which he always values at R0,s i n c eQ>Z.
For long players, we need to distinguish between \small" longs (players with no market
power at date 0) and \large" longs (players with market power at date 0). This distinction
is important because only large longs can implement a squeeze at date 2. (If a small long
buys the entire auction, there will be no long players left with market power at date 2). The
value to a large long from winning a qth unit is: (i) Rh if he will be implementing a short
squeeze, (ii) R0+–(Rh¡R0) if he will free-ride on somebody else’s squeezing eﬁorts; (iii) R0
if none of the longs are su–ciently large to implement a squeeze (perhaps because all the
other Q¡q units are going to the short); or (iv) R • R0 if by winning this extra unit the
player becomes just large enough that he stops somebody else implementing a squeeze.
Again, we cannot unequivocally specify a large long’s valuation schedule. However, in
general, a large long values the ﬂrst few units lower than the last unit, which he always
values at Rh, since if he buys all units he will implement a short squeeze for sure.
Finally, the value to a small long from capturing a qth unit can also be R0+–(Rh¡R0)
(if he free-rides on a squeeze), R0 (if there is no squeeze), or R • R0 (if he stops a squeeze).
Unlike a large long, the small long generally values the ﬂrst few units higher than the last
unit, which he always values at R0. This opposite pattern is a result of the small long’s
inability to implement a short squeeze.
The above discussion illustrates the conditional nature of valuation schedules. It also
illustrates that the short has a strong incentive to bid aggressively for a few units only,
in order to try to avoid being squeezed. Long players may also beneﬂt from bidding
aggressively for a few units only, provided that they can free-ride on somebody else’s
squeezing eﬁorts. However, their incentive is not as strong as the short’s, because of the
risk that a short squeeze will not happen.
4.2 Large Uniform Auctions with Many Longs
In uniform auctions, the fact that bidders pay the stop-out rate { as opposed to what they
actually bid { is exploited by the short player, in the same way as for N =2 .
Theorem 4 It is equilibrium for Player 1 to submit b
u
1 = f(Rh;Z);(R0;Q¡ Z)g in uni-
form auctions and for all other players to submit b
u
n = f(R0;Q)g (regardless of the scope
for free-riding). The outcome of this equilibrium, which is also the unique equilibrium
15outcome, is as follows: First, the revenue to the seller is QR0 and the stop-out rate is R0.
Second, for every n,t h ep a y o ﬁi sg i v e nb y…n = yn;0R0. Third, there is no short squeeze
in the secondary market.
As before, the short places a larger value than the longs on the ﬂrst Z units. Therefore,
he bids aggressively for these units and, in a sense, thus pre-empts a short squeeze. This
aggressive bidding is not costly to the short since the absence of a squeeze means that
longs are not willing to bid above R0, implying that the equilibrium stop-out rate is R0.
4.3 Large Discriminatory Auctions with Many Longs
In large discriminatory auctions with many longs there is no pure strategy equilibrium, for
t h es a m er e a s o na sf o rN = 2. When the scope for free-riding is large, a potentially impor-
tant force in discriminatory auctions is the disincentive for long players to bid aggressively,
since smaller longs may do better on a per unit basis than larger longs.
Theorem 5 (Existence, characterization, and uniqueness) Suppose the auction is
discriminatory. For each of the M long players with the largest market power at date 0,
there is an equilibrium in which only that player and the short are aggressive, with all other
players being passive. In particular, for each n =2 ;:::;M+1the following is equilibrium:
(i) The short submits b
⁄
1 = f(~ S;Z);(R0;q⁄
1;2)g; where q⁄
1;2 2f 0;:::;Q¡ Zg and ~ S is a







(ii) Player n submits b
⁄
n = f(~ L;Q)g,w h e r e~ L is a random variable with realization L 2
[R0; „ RQZ] and cumulative distribution function
G(L;–)=
Z(Rh ¡ „ RQZ)+–(Rh ¡ R0)(jy1;0j¡Z)
Z(Rh ¡ L)+–(Rh ¡ R0)(jy1;0j¡Z)
: (17)
(iii) Every other player i submits b
⁄
i = f(R0;Q)g.
Finally, there is no other equilibrium in which only one long is aggressive and he or the
short submits only one bid.15
This theorem describes M diﬁerent equilibria, one for each player with the largest market
power at date 0. Since these players are indistinguishable from each other, the M equilibria
are observationally equivalent. In these equilibria, only the short and one of the largest
longs are active. The two active banks play mixed strategies and a short squeeze occurs
with positive probability. While the active long submits only one bid, the short splits his
bids into a high bid for the units he needs to cover and a bid for some additional units
at the competitive rate, R0.T h ee x a c ta m o u n tt h es h o r tb i d sf o ra tR0 has no eﬁect on
15To be precise, the equilibria described in the theorem are unique up to trivial variations such as where
some passive bidders do not submit bids at all, demand less than Q at R0, or submit bids below R0,e t c .
16bidders’ payoﬁs. In a sense, therefore, the theorem shows that there is a unique single-bid
equilibrium also for N>2.
The result that no other banks are active in equilibrium expands our \no-entry" result
for N = 2. However, the current result is more general as it shows that, in equilibrium,
most long players strategically choose not to participate actively in the auction. This is
surprising. When the scope for free-riding is large, it is partly driven by the desire to
free-ride on a squeeze. But this alone cannot explain why these bidders do not attempt
to augment their positions in the auction by bidding aggressively for a small number of
units. Furthermore, when the scope for free-riding is small, one might think that longs
would compete in the auction in order to be the player with the largest market power at
date 2. In either case, most longs decide not to bid aggressively for any number of units
because the risk that the short will manage to cover in the auction is too large.16
Theorem 5 establishes that there are no \single-bid" equilibria where one of the smaller
longs with market power is aggressive and all other longs are passive.17 The intuition has
its roots in how the short tailors his strategy according to the market power of the active
long. The proof of the theorem shows that in a hypothetical equilibrium where the active
long has zn;0 <Z , the short is not as aggressive as when one of the largest longs is
active. The implication is that one of the largest longs can step in and earn abnormal
proﬂts. Finally, the theorem also demonstrates that the equilibrium impact of the scope
for free-riding is quantitative but not qualitative. In particular, the only eﬁect is on the
distribution used by the aggressive long.
4.4 Small Auctions with Many Longs
Here, we complete the analysis by considering small auctions.
Theorem 6 Suppose Q<Z . Irrespective of the auction type and the scope for free-riding,
in equilibrium: (i) There is a short squeeze for sure; and (ii) auction revenue is QRh.
The intuition for why all units are lent at Rh irrespective of the auction format relates
to the players’ valuation schedules. When the auction is small, the short is unable to cover,
implying that there will be a squeeze for sure and consequently that at least two players
value each auctioned unit at Rh. Competition drives the auction rate up to Rh.18
In contrast with large discriminatory auctions, after a small auction has been held,
several players may turn out to have the largest market power. This can happen, for
16Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) show, in a single unit, private values setting that negative (or positive)
externalities can lead to \non-strategic participation". Our multi-unit auction result is driven by the fear
that free-riding will not be possible and, to a smaller extent, the desire to free-ride.
17While we cannot say for sure that there are no other equilibria than those identiﬂed in Theorem 5,
the general message that there will be short squeezing under the discriminatory auction is robust, since
there are only mixed strategy equilibria.
18When Q = Z<jy1;0j, the probability of a short squeeze depends on –.I f– = 1, the probability is
zero because if the short buys all Z units, he avoids being squeezed on jy1;0j. Hence, his average valuation
is above Rh.I f – = 0, the short and all longs with market power value all units at Rh. In equilibrium,
they bid this and there will be a short squeeze for sure because of rationing. When Q = Z = jy1;0j,t h e r e
also will be a squeeze for sure because of rationing.
17example, if there are several largest longs to begin with and none of them buys in the
auction, or if all of them submit the same bids. The former could happen when the scope
for free-riding is large; in this case, the competition between other longs and the short will
sometimes be so intense that there is no beneﬂt for any of the largest longs to become
active. In contrast, when the scope for free-riding is small, all longs with market power
have a strong incentive to bid aggressively so as to protect their market power.
5 Large Auctions: Implications and Predictions
In this section, we draw out empirical implications and predictions of our model. We focus
on large uniform (Theorem 4) and discriminatory (Theorem 5) auctions with many longs
where there is the potential for a short squeeze (Z>0). Our ﬂndings are divided into
two parts: bidder behavior and auction performance. It should be emphasized that the
predictions of our model are, by design, pure implications of the loser’s nightmare.
5.1 Bidder Behavior
We focus on measures of individual bidder behavior that have been used in the empirical
literature; for example, number of bids, total quantity demanded, and quantity weighted
mean price and variance [Gordy (1999) and Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundaresan (2001)].
Our ﬂndings delineate the diﬁerences in behavior between short and long bidders and are
testable by someone possessing the appropriate data set.
When players use mixed strategies, as in our model in discriminatory auctions, what is
most easily observed by an econometrician are the realizations of these mixed strategies.
Our model delivers sharp predictions regarding these realizations, which can be tested by
examining the bids submitted by short and long bidders in a given auction.
Proposition 4 Given any realization of the equilibrium strategies of the players, the num-
ber of bids and the quantity weighted variance of the bids submitted by the short player tends
to be larger than that of any long player, irrespective of the auction mechanism. Moreover,
in uniform auctions, the average rate (or price) of the bids submitted by the short player
is larger than that of any long player.
The ﬂrst statement is a simple consequence of the observation that in the equilibria de-
scribed in Theorems 4 and 5, the short submits two bids and the longs submit only one
bid each. The second statement follows directly from the result that in uniform auctions,
the short submits a bid at Rh, or higher, and (possibly) one at R0, while the longs sub-
mit their bids at R0. Note that in discriminatory auctions, it would be meaningless to
compare the short and aggressive long’s mean bids in a single auction since their bids are
stochastic. However, since most longs are passive, we would expect to see the short place
bids at higher mean rates than most longs. Furthermore, in discriminatory auctions: (i)
shorts, but not longs, always demand some quantity at rates above the competitive rate,
but (ii) when long players do so, they tend to demand more than shorts.
Next, we address the stochastic properties of equilibrium strategies in discriminatory
auctions. The resulting propositions can be tested using a cross-section of auctions.
18Proposition 5 In discriminatory auctions, F(S) ﬂrst order stochastically dominates G(L;–):
This expands the result for N = 2 illustrated in Figure 1. The intuition derives from
the fact that the short values the ﬂrst few units very highly compared with the average
valuation the aggressive long places on all Q units { and recall that F(S) is the distribution
used by the short for Z units, while G(L;–) is the distribution used by the long for Q units.
Proposition 6 In discriminatory auctions, G(L;–) is an increasing function of the scope
for free-riding, –.
This proposition shows that as the scope for free-riding increases, the active long becomes
less aggressive in the sense of ﬂrst order stochastic dominance. This can be understood by
noting that it also means that the short becomes more aggressive in relative terms, which
is intuitive since an increase in – translates into an increase in the cost to the short in the
event of a squeeze. The reason that it is the long’s, and not the short’s, strategy that is
aﬁected by changes in the scope for free-riding is essentially that the short still needs Z
units to cover. For the same reason, the short’s strategy is the same as it were for N =2 ,
as revealed by a comparison between Theorems 2 and 5.
Proposition 7 In discriminatory auctions, the expected quantity weighted mean bid for
the short is greater or equal to that of the aggressive long (equal if and only if N =2or
– =0 ).
The diﬁerence in the mean bids of the short and aggressive long is a consequence of
diﬁerences in valuations. When there are no free-riders, the short’s average valuation of
the Q auctioned units is the same as that of the aggressive long, namely „ RQZ.H o w e v e r ,
when there are free-riders the short’s average valuation is higher, since he then values the
ﬂrst few units above Rh. This leads the short to have a higher equilibrium mean bid than
the aggressive long.
Proposition 8 In discriminatory auctions, the expected quantity weighted mean bids for
the short and aggressive long are strictly decreasing in auction size, Q.
This is a consequence of the price-quantity tradeoﬁ faced by the aggressive long: when
auction size grows, he has to buy more units to squeeze on the same number of units.
Consequently the long’s willingness to bid aggressively drops. In equilibrium, the short
adjusts his bids downwards in response to the long’s less aggressive bidding.
Proposition 9 Suppose N =2 . In discriminatory auctions, the variance of the quantity
weighted mean bid is larger for the long than for the short.
In the case of two players the short’s variance is smaller primarily because the short always
places a proportion of his bids at R0. Additionally, the fact that the long has a mass point
at R0 tends to augment the long’s variance.
195.2 Auction Performance
Here, we compare the performance of uniform and discriminatory auctions on three mea-
sures: revenue, the probability of a short squeeze, and (by implication) post-auction volatil-
ity. A clear message that has emerged from our analysis is that a short squeeze is more
likely under discriminatory auctions than under uniform auctions, ceteris paribus.T h i s
appears to be a fundamental and robust result, arising from the diﬁerent valuation sched-
ules of the shorts and longs and the uniform pricing scheme, which allows shorts to bid
very aggressively for a few units without having to worry about paying what they bid.
Initially, we focus on discriminatory auctions, since the outcome of uniform auctions is
already summarized in Theorem 4. We start by looking deeper into the determinants of
a short squeeze. Deﬂne £ to be the equilibrium probability of a short squeeze when the
auction is discriminatory. For N = 2, Theorem 2 implies that £ = Z=2Q,w h i c hl e a d st o
the intuitively appealing results that £ is increasing in the market power of the long and













where ˆ = Z(1 ¡ –)+jy1;0j–.F o r – =0 ,£i st h es a m ea sf o rN =2 . 19 This tells us
that in the general case, the equilibrium probability of a short squeeze depends on the
exogenous parameters in quite non-trivial ways. The change in £ with respect to Q can


















The ﬂrst term is a \direct" eﬁect; it captures the eﬁect an increase in Q has on F(¢)a n d
G(¢;–), keeping the upper bound of these distributions, „ RQZ, constant. The second term
is an \indirect" eﬁect; it captures the eﬁect of the decrease in „ RQZ that results from an
increase in Q. It can be shown that the \direct" eﬁect is always positive and the \indirect"
eﬁect is always negative. A similar decomposition can be done for Z, but in this case the
\direct" eﬁect is negative and the \indirect" eﬁect is positive.
When N =2o r– = 0, the equilibrium probability of a short squeeze in discriminatory
auctions is decreasing in auction size and increasing in Z. As i m i l a rr e s u l ti sr e a c h e di n
the following proposition for N>2a n d–>0.
Proposition 10 Suppose N>2 and –>0.( i )T h e r ei s„ Q ‚ Z such that for all Q> „ Q,
the discriminatory auction equilibrium probability of a short squeeze, £, is decreasing in
the auction size, Q. Moreover „ Q approaches Z as – goes to zero. (ii) There is „ Z such that
for all Z<„ Z, £ is increasing in Z. Moreover, „ Z approaches Q as – goes to zero. (iii) £
is decreasing in the scope for free-riding, –.( i v )£ is decreasing in the absolute value of
the short’s initial holding, jy1;0j. (v) In the limit as either Q or jy1;0j becomes arbitrarily
large, £ goes to zero.
19 Note also that for N>2a n d–>0, lim–!0+ £=Z=2Q.
20The ﬂrst statement of the proposition shows that the indirect eﬁect dominates for su–-
ciently large Q. This can be understood by recalling that „ RQZ is also the long’s break-even
value; it is the maximum that he is willing to pay for Q units. The valuation of the short,
however, for the ﬂrst Z units is unaﬁected by Q.S oa s„ RQZ falls, the valuation gap between
the aggressive long and the short becomes increasingly large, hence the long’s willingness
to be aggressive falls relative to that of the short. The upshot is that the probability of a
short squeeze falls when the auction becomes larger.
The second statement of the proposition has a similar intuition, but in this case „ RQZ is
increasing in Z. Hence, the equilibrium probability of a short squeeze tends to increase as
the market power of the largest long increases. The third statement is a simple consequence
of the result that G(L;–)i si n c r e a s i n gi n– while F(S) is not aﬁected by –.
The fourth statement of the proposition can be understood by noting that for jy1;0j
there is no \indirect" eﬁect since „ RQZ does not depend on jy1;0j. The proposition shows
that, ceteris paribus, as the short’s position grows, the \direct" eﬁect is negative. This
is because more of the beneﬂts to the longs from short squeezing will go to free-riders,
thus leading the active long to bid less aggressively. It is important to keep in mind that
this is a comparative statics result. In practice, it is likely that Z and jy1;0j are positively
correlated, but here Z is being kept constant.
Figure 2 depicts the probability of a short squeeze as a function of auction size. The
ﬂgure shows the typical situation when N>2a n d–>0 that the probability of a short
squeeze is initially increasing and then decreasing. Figure 3 depicts a similar, but opposite
pattern for £ as a function of the largest long’s market power. Figure 4 shows the eﬁect on
£ of changing the short’s initial holding. Figures 2 and 4 also illustrate the ﬂfth statement
in Proposition 10. Intuitively, when auction size or the short’s initial holding approaches
inﬂnity, the aggressive long and the short’s bidding strategies \diverge"; that is, the short
places almost all the mass of his bid for Z units in a neighborhood of „ RQZ,w h i l et h el o n g ’ s
mass point at R0 approaches 1. Hence, the probability of a short squeeze approaches zero.
Proposition 11 In the discriminatory auction equilibrium where long player n is aggres-
sive, expected payoﬁs are: (i) The short: E[…1]=y1;0R0 ¡ ( „ RQZ ¡ R0)Z. (ii) Aggressive
long: E[…n]=y2;0R0. (iii) Passive longs: for i= 2f 1;ng, E[…i]=yi;0[R0 +£ –(Rh ¡ R0)].
(iv) Auctioneer (central bank): E[…A]=QR0 + Z( „ RQZ ¡ R0) ¡
P
i‚3 yi;0(Rh ¡ R0)–£:
This proposition shows that, in expectation, the short pays less than his valuation of Rh
to cover the units he needs. Moreover, the aggressive long does not earn any rents from a
squeeze { all his quasi-rents when a squeeze occurs go to the seller in the auction, through
the rate the aggressive long ends up paying when there is no squeeze. Intuitively, this is
because the short values the ﬂrst few units higher than the long. Hence, competition from
the short drives the rents of the active long to zero. This sheds light on why other longs
are passive. From the short’s perspective, the limited competition from the longs allows
him to buy below his valuation. However, a comparison with Theorem 4 shows that the
short does not do as well in discriminatory auctions as in uniform auctions. In contrast to
the aggressive long, when there is some scope for free-riding, passive longs earn positive
abnormal returns in expectation.
21Proposition 11 also shows that the expected equilibrium payoﬁs to the short and ag-
gressive long are unaﬁected by the scope for free-riding. This irrelevance result contrasts
with the result on the equilibrium probability of a short squeeze above. It can be under-
stood by an analogy to private value, single unit, second price auctions. In these auctions,
the bidder with the highest valuation wins and pays the valuation of the second highest
bidder. In our case, the short is the player with the higher valuation; he values the ﬂrst
Z units at Rh. The long values all Q units at an average of „ RQZ <R h.I n s p e c t i o no ft h e
short’s expected equilibrium payoﬁ reveals that it equals the value of his initial holding
less the amount ( „ RQZ ¡ R0)Z, which we can interpret as an excess payment over the \no
squeeze" value of Z units. Essentially, the short is paying the valuation of the aggressive
long. Put another way, the short’s excess payment is the smallest amount that guarantees
that he will not be squeezed. Since the aggressive long’s valuation is not aﬁected by the
scope for free-riding, neither is the short’s expected equilibrium payoﬁ.
An implication of Proposition 11 is that the short’s expected equilibrium payoﬁ is
increasing in the auction size, since „ RQZ is decreasing in Q. This is another contrast
with the result on the probability of a short squeeze, which may exhibit a non-monotonic
pattern as a function of Q (Figure 2). What happens when £ is increasing in Q is that
this is oﬁset by a lower average payment of the short in the event of no squeeze.
Proposition 12 Compared to discriminatory auctions, uniform auctions lead to (in ex-
pectation): lower auction revenue, fewer short squeezes, and lower post-auction volatility.
The result that auction revenue is higher in discriminatory auctions is interesting, not least
because at a ﬂrst glance it appears to be counterfactual. For example, empirical studies of
US Treasury auctions show that markups (deﬂned as the diﬁerence between auction and
when-issued yields) are larger in discriminatory auctions than in uniform auctions [Nyborg
and Sundaresan (1996), Malvey and Archibald (1998)]. This suggests a smaller revenue
under discriminatory auctions. However, the problem with this inference is that when
there is the potential for a short squeeze or when a squeeze is on, the when-issued yield
will contain a \squeeze premium." In this case, the markup is not an accurate re￿ection
of auction revenue (Nyborg and Sundaresan, 1996). Hence, revenue may be larger under
discriminatory auctions even though the markup is larger, which is essentially what would
be happening under our model. The larger revenue is a pure re￿ection of the increased
likelihood of a short squeeze.
Short squeezing tends to lead to higher volatility in the secondary market, since some
units change hands at Rh >R 0. Our result that the probability of short squeezing is
higher after discriminatory auctions therefore means that volatility will tend to be higher
too. This is consistent with the empirical evidence (Nyborg and Sundaresan, 1996). In
the context of treasury auctions, for example, we would expect a short squeeze to manifest
itself through the specialness of the on-the-run security. Thus, another testable prediction
of our model is that specialness should explain more of volatility after discriminatory
auctions than after uniform auctions.
Proposition 12 shows that the revenue advantage of discriminatory auctions comes at
the cost of a higher incidence of short squeezes and consequently a more volatile secondary
market. There may be no straight answer to the problem of choosing the auction format; it
22will depend on the aims and preferences of the auctioneer. Sellers who are more interested
in maximizing revenue would do better with the discriminatory auction than with the
uniform auction. Sellers who are more interested in minimizing market distortions would
do better with the uniform auction.
The ﬂnal two propositions examine the impact of auction size on short squeezing and
revenue per unit in discriminatory auctions.
Proposition 13 In discriminatory auctions, revenue per unit is monotonically decreasing
in auction size.
This is quite intuitive, since the valuation gap between the short and the aggressive long
is increasing in auction size.
Proposition 14 As either
Q
Z !1or, for –>0,
jy1;0j
Z !1the equilibrium outcome in
the discriminatory auction approaches the outcome in the uniform auction.
This asymptotic equivalence is intuitive since when Q becomes very large with respect
to Z, the cost of implementing a squeeze becomes very large relative to the beneﬂt. Put
another way, the break-even value for the long approaches the competitive rate.
6E x t e n s i o n s
6.1 Pre-Auction Market
Given our results that pre-auction allocations aﬁect auction performance and payoﬁs, it is
natural to ask how these positions are formed in the ﬂrst place and what is the in￿uence
of the auction format. To make this extension of the model realistic, one would have to
recognize that in many contexts the set of players in the forward market may be diﬁerent
than in the auction itself. For example, in the context of central bank repo auctions, com-
mercial banks are subject to client withdrawals and deposits, and the auction is only open
to banks. In US Treasury securities markets, pension funds and other institutions are often
active in the when-issued market, but not in the auction. Non-bidders may trade in the
pre-auction market perhaps because of hedging motives (Nyborg and Sundaresan, 1996).
Since hedgers may have price sensitive demand, bidders’ positions right before the auction
may be a function of the forward prices that they have posted. Furthermore, diﬁerent
bidders may end up with diﬁerent positions, perhaps because they have relations with
diﬁerent clients.
Intuition based on our model would suggest that prices in the pre-auction market will
tend to be higher under discriminatory auctions than under uniform auctions, re￿ecting
the larger likelihood of a short squeeze. As a result, it is possible that the open interest in
the pre-auction market will be lower under discriminatory auctions. This could explain the
ﬂnding that when-issued volume is considerably larger under uniform auctions (Nyborg
and Sundaresan, 1996). A lower open interest may also serve to reduce the incidence of
short squeezes and make the performance of discriminatory auctions appear more similar
to uniform auctions. The cost would be reduced hedging under the discriminatory format.
236.2 Multiple Shorts
Another issue is that pre-auction trading may result in multiple bidders with short po-
sitions. Supposing that there is at least one long bidder as well, we see that the shorts’
valuation schedules are still downward sloping. Furthermore, the shorts need to buy Z
units in the auction to avoid being squeezed. Hence, equilibria of large uniform auctions
are characterized by (some of) the shorts bidding Rh for Z units, with the remaining bids
placed at R0. As in Theorems 1 and 4, there are no short squeezes. For discriminatory
auctions, the diﬁerent valuation schedules of players still means that there are no pure
strategy equilibria, implying that a squeeze will happen with positive probability. How-
ever, equilibrium strategies would be more complicated than in Theorem 5, because many
shorts may choose to bid aggressively.
6.3 Negative Initial Aggregate Position
Due to pre-auction demand by hedgers who do not participate in the auction, bidders in
the auction may have a negative initial aggregate position(Q0 < 0). This would necessitate
a change in the deﬂnition of market power, since in the absence of an auction a long player
would have monopoly power over all his units (assuming hedgers would not sell back
into the market). That is, Player n’s date 0 market power would be zn;0 =m a x [ 0 ;y n;0].
Furthermore, shorts would have to buy a total of Q0 units in the auction to avoid being
squeezed. Hence, Q0 would essentially take on the role of Z.S o w e w o u l d n o w d e ﬂ n e
a large auction as one where Q>Q 0. The combination of Q0 < 0 and multiple shorts
raises the interesting possibility that in a large auction, players that are short at date 0
will be able to implement a short squeeze at date 2 if they buy the entire auction. Hence,
short players may have U-shaped valuation schedules. However, as before, the equilibrium
probability of a short squeeze is zero under large uniform auctions and positive under
large discriminatory auctions. As a consequence, expected auction revenue would be lower
under uniform auctions than under discriminatory auctions.
6.4 Secondary Market
It also would be interesting to incorporate a more realistic model of the secondary market.
Starting with Kyle (1984), a common feature of models of short squeezing is that a squeeze
is only possible if some long player has a combined position in the forward and spot markets
of the underlying asset of more than 100%. However, events surrounding the Salomon
scandal demonstrate that squeezing can be implemented with a smaller position [Jegadeesh
(1993), Jordan and Jordan (1996)]. Additionally, empirical evidence by Sundaresan (1994)
as well as anecdotal evidence suggest that short squeezing happens from time to time in US
Treasury auctions even when the 35% rule is observed. This suggests that the mechanics
of a short squeeze are more subtle than what is currently modeled in the literature as
well as in our paper. Capturing this would enrich our model and quite possibly lead
to additional empirical predictions; however, we would expect the basic thrust of our
conclusion regarding the diﬁerence between uniform and discriminatory auctions to remain
valid.
247 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have studied the impact of a potential short squeeze in the secondary
market on equilibrium bidding strategies in a multiple unit auction. What is important for
o u ra n a l y s i si sn o tthe actual occurrence of a short squeeze, but the possibility of one. We
have established closed form solutions for equilibrium strategies and outcomes and found
that: (1) Players who have the opportunity to short squeeze, who have the potential to
free-ride on a short squeeze, who are not aﬁected by a short squeeze, or who risk being short
squeezed, have diﬁerent marginal valuations of the auctioned asset in an otherwise standard
common value environment. (2) There is a trade-oﬁ between the two auction types that are
most frequently used in practice, namely uniform and discriminatory auction. Speciﬂcally,
discriminatory auctions lead to more price distortion and higher after-auction volatility,
however, they also provide more revenue to the seller. (3) In discriminatory auctions, price
distortion and the probability of a short squeeze depend on the size of the auction, market
power of the largest longs, and the scope for free riding. (4) In uniform auctions, bidders
with higher average bids spread their bids more. (5) In both types of auctions, short
players tend to spread their bids more than long players. (6) The scope for free-riding
does not aﬁect the qualitative nature of equilibria in the two auction formats.
We have motivated our model with reference to the fact that many large and important
multi-unit auctions in ﬂnancial and commodity markets are embedded in larger structures,
where bidders often enter the auction with short positions and must cover in the auction
or, failing that, in the after-market where they can be squeezed. More generally, our model
is also applicable to secondary market situations where a remedy against a short squeeze
is sought.20 A recent squeeze took place in the gold markets at the end of February 2001:
[Gold lease] rates have been squeezed considerably by the requirements of bor-
rowers versus a lack of lenders. Yesterday afternoon, there was substantial
lending from one of the central banks...(Dow Jones Newswires, February 2001)
The jump in the one month gold lease rate from its normal level of less than 1% to above
4.5% in a matter of days is testimony to this particular short squeeze. The fact that the
12 month rate was at most around 2% during this time is also consistent with a short
squeeze. One may attempt to alleviate a short squeeze by releasing additional stock to
the market, as indeed seems to have happened in our gold squeeze example. However,
this is likely to be a blunt instrument unless one can ﬂnd a way of actually selling to the
20Well known short squeezes in commodity markets include the Hunt brothers’ silver squeeze in the
late 1970’s and the Sumitomo copper squeeze in the 1990’s. Other examples in various markets include:
30 year US Treasury bonds (The Economist, 12 February 2000), the German government bond futures
market (eFinancial News, 26 March 2001) [\Deutsche Bank makes Euro 50m from Bobl squeeze."], ABN
AMRO (on the Lander 5 bond), (Euroweek, 15 May 1998), Japanese government bond futures market
(Barron’s, 28 October 1996) [\A giant short squeeze involving Japanese government bonds futures last
month...apparently prompted actions by Japanese regulators. The squeeze...was the largest in the
history of global ﬂnancial futures markets..."], NYMEX gas futures (Futures, February 1996), Apex Oil
(Forbes, 24 May 1982). Backwardation in commodity futures is also often attributed to short squeezes
or potential short squeezes. In the equity markets, small cap/small ￿oat stocks seem to be particularly
vulnerable to short squeezes. Examples include: MicroStrategy (Washington Business Journal, 16 June
2000), Solv-Ex (Business Week, 5 August 1996), Presstek (Forbes, 17 June 1996).
25shorts rather than the longs. In practice, trying to locate and verify who is short may
be di–cult, costly, and time consuming. However, our analysis suggests that the uniform
auction may be an eﬁective mechanism that achieves the objective of selling to the shorts,
and the auction can be organized quickly and relatively cheaply.
There are numerous ways to extend our model. We have already discussed some of them
in the previous section. Other issues that would be interesting to pursue in the context of
our framework include: How does private information about allocations aﬁect the results?
What is the impact of private information about the competitive and \squeeze" rates? Is
there a relation between the winner’s curse and short squeezing? For example, private
information may give positive rents to a short squeezer. Supply uncertainty would also be
interesting to examine. For instance, in US treasury auctions, non-competitive demand
creates supply uncertainty for competitive bidders. We believe that the relative simplicity
of our model would make it a useful building block in examining these and other issues.
Finally, the richness of the model’s predictions along with its relative simple structure
makes our model potentially useful in experimental settings.
8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose that Player 1 submits bu
1. If Player 2 does nothing or submits bu
2, his payoﬁ will be
R0y2;0. The only possible way for Player 2 to improve on this is to implement a squeeze. To do
this, Player 2 must bid above Rh for at least Q0 ‚ Q ¡ Z + 1 units. If he does so, his payoﬁ is
…2 = R0y2;0 +( Rh ¡ R0)(Z ¡ (Q ¡ Q0))¡ (a2;1 ¡ R0)Q0 <R 0y2;0 +( Rh ¡ R0)(Z ¡ Q) <R 0y2;0;
using (8), the fact that z2;2 = Z ¡ (Q ¡ y2;1)=Z ¡ (Q ¡ Q0), and a2;1 <R h. Hence, Player 2
cannot do better than submitting bu
2 in response to bu
1.S i n c ebu
1 is a best response to bu
2,t h e s e
strategies form an equilibrium. To show that any other equilibrium will give the same outcome
as (bu
1;bu
2), we observe ﬂrst that it is always a best response for Player 1 to submit bu
1 as long
as Player 2 does not demand Q units at Rh or higher. Second, since (as observed in the text)
the most Player 2 would be willing to pay for Q units is „ RQZ <R h, it follows that any other
equilibrium is a trivial variation of (bu
1;bu
2). Finally, since in equilibrium Player 1 wins Z units,
there is no short-squeezing in the secondary market. 2
Proof of Lemma 1
Note ﬂrst that under pure strategies, the auction outcome is known with certainty. Furthermore,
it is not consistent with equilibrium for the short to pay more than R0 for more than Z units
and therefore for the long to demand more than „ RQZ for any unit.
Suppose ﬂrst that there is a pure strategy equilibrium when z2;2 = 0. It would be inconsistent
with this for the long to pay more than R0 for any unit in the auction, and therefore, for the
short to pay more than R0 + † for any unit, where † ‚ 0 is arbitrarily small. Hence, the highest
bid is at most R0 +† and is made by the short. But then the long could do better by submitting
ab i df o rQ units at R0 + † + †1,w h e r e†1 > 0 is arbitrarily small. This is a contradiction.
Suppose next that there is an equilibrium in pure strategies when z2;2 > 0. This means that
the long buys more than Q ¡ Z units in the auction. Deﬂne rz to be the rate at which the long
26wins his Q¡Z +1th unit.21 In equilibrium, we must have rz • „ RQZ. But then, since the short
values his ﬂrst Z units at Rh > „ RQZ, the short can improve his payoﬁ by submitting a bid for 1
unit at rz + †,w h e r e†>0 is arbitrarily small. This is a contradiction. 2
Proof of Theorem 2
Here we complete the proof started in the text. Under the proposed strategies, expected payoﬁs
are E[…S]=¡Z „ RQZ and E[…L]=y2;0R0: We ﬂrst examine whether the short can improve on
this by splitting his bid for Z units. Suppose the short splits this into Z bids, f(Sk;1)gZ
k=1,w h e r e




G(Sk)(Rh ¡ Sk) ¡ ZRh = ¡Z „ RQZ: (20)
Hence, no matter how the short splits his bid for Z units, his payoﬁ remains ¡Z „ RQZ.
Next, we examine whether the long might improve his payoﬁ by splitting his bid. So suppose
t h el o n gs p l i t st h i si n t oQ bids, f(Lk;1)g
Q














Notice that the second and the third parts of this expression have the same number of terms
((Q ¡ Z)Z). Since Lk ‚ Lk+1, it follows that the last two terms sum to something which is at
most zero. Hence, no matter how the long splits his bid for Q units, he cannot improve on his
expected payoﬁ of R0y2;0. This establishes the theorem. 2
Proof of Theorem 3
If a player bids for less than Q units, the other player can pick up some units at a rate below R0,
which is not consistent with equilibrium. Hence, in a single bid equilibrium, at least one of b1 or
b2 has form: (~ r;Q). But b1 cannot take this form if Pr(~ r>R 0) > 0, since the short values only
the ﬂrst Z units above R0. Additionally, Lemma 1 shows that b1 = f(R0;Q)g is not consistent
with equilibrium. Therefore, in a single bid equilibrium, b2 = f(~ r;Q)g. Hence, by the proof of
Theorem 2, it only remains to show that the support of F(¢)a n dG(¢)i s[ R0; „ RQZ]a n dt h a tF(¢)
and G(¢) do not have coinciding mass points. Clearly, the lower bound of the support is R0.
But suppose that the upper bound of the support is ^ R< „ RQZ.S o l v i n gf o rF(S)a n dG(L)a s
before (Theorem 2), we ﬂnd that both F(S)a n dG(L) have mass points at R0.B u tt h e n ,f o r
some †>0, the long could increase his payoﬁ by placing his mass point at R0 + †. Similarly, if
F(¢)a n dG(¢) have coinciding mass points above R0, at least one of the players could improve
his payoﬁ by moving the mass point up slightly. Since F(L)a n dG(S)a r et h eu n i q u es o l u t i o n s
for particular boundaries when there are no coinciding mass points, this concludes the proof. 2
21If rationing at the stop-out rate means that the long only wins Q ¡ Z + ￿ units, where ￿<1, rz is
t h er a t ea tw h i c ht h el o n gw i n sh i sl a s t￿ units.
22This speciﬂcation is completely general, since a bid at R0 gives the same payoﬁ as no bid at all. The
speciﬂcation allows for the short submitting any number Z0 • Z of bids at any prices above R0.A s
established above, the short cannot improve his payoﬁ by demanding more than Z units above R0.





k=1 ¡Sk) ¡ Rh)+:::+( G(S2) ¡ G(S1))(¡S1 ¡(Z ¡1)Rh)+( 1¡ G(S1))(¡ZRh):











k=Q¡Z+1 F(Lk)(Rh ¡ Lk) ¡
PQ¡Z
k=1 Lk.
27Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the case – = 1, since it will maximize the potential beneﬂts from entry. Under the
proposed strategies, to stop the short from covering in the auction, new entrants must get at
least Q ¡ Z + 1 units. Suppose new entrants buy Q0 ‚ Q ¡ Z + 1 units. Under the proposed
strategies, the short gets max[0;Q¡ Q0] units. Hence, 8nz n;2 = 0. Thus, new entrants would
earn negative proﬂts since they would have to pay more than R0 on the Q0 units obtained in the
auction, so they would be better oﬁ not participating at all (or placing bids at R0). 2
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the case – = 1, since it will maximize the potential beneﬂts from entry. If any player
with zero initial endowment bids for 1 unit at l>R 0, his expected payoﬁ is
E[…E]=( R0 ¡ l)
Z
[R0;l]




Note that E[…Ejl = R0]=0a n d
@E[…E]
@l





@l < 0f o rl<„ RQZ. Hence, E[…E] < 0 for all l>R 0.T h i s
expands trivially if the potential entrant bids for more than 1 unit up to Z¡1 units. There is no
beneﬂt from bidding for Z or more units, since if the potential new entrant were awarded this,
there would be no short squeezing. 2
Proof of Theorem 4
The proof is virtually the same as for the case N = 2 (see the proof of Theorem 1). 2
Proof of Theorem 5
We will prove the Theorem for q⁄
1;2 = Q ¡ Z.T h ec a s et h a tq⁄
1;2 <Q¡ Z follows immediately.
Parts (i)a n d( ii): Let F(S)a n dG(L;–) denote the random parts of the short’s and aggressive
long’s strategies, respectively. We wish to show that they are given by (16) and (17), respectively.
Using the same procedure as in the proof of Theorem 2, we see that F(S) is given by (16).













since under the proposed strategies X = 1 in the event of a squeeze [see (7)], which implies that
G(L;–) is given by (17). The proof that the long will not deviate is the same as in Theorem 2, since
the short’s strategy is the same. Suppose now that the short deviates from the described strategy
and splits his bid for Z units into Z bids (assuming Z ‚ 2), f(Sk;1)gZ
k=1,w h e r eSk ‚ Sk+1 and





The expression above is strictly increasingin SZ. Hence, the short will set SZ = SZ¡1. Proceeding
in the same vein, we get Sk=Sk¡1, k =2:::Z¡1. Thus, the short maximizes his payoﬁ by bidding
S1 for all Z units and therefore cannot improve his payoﬁ by deviating from b⁄
1.
28Part (iii): For i = K +2 ;:::;N, zi;0 =0 ,P a r t( iii) can be established along the same lines
as the no market-entry result in Proposition 3. Next, suppose that i =2 ;:::;K+1a n di 6 = n.
Suppose ﬂrst that Z ‚ 2. Then if a player bids for one unit at rate l, R0 • l • „ RQZ, the change
in his expected payoﬁ relative to what he gets by being passive (excess payoﬁ) is












@l [R0 ¡ l + –(Rh ¡ R0)F(l)] ¡ G(l;–)=C[R0(Z ¡ Q)– + Rh(Z(– ¡ 1) ¡j y1;0j–)+
L(Z +( Q + jy1;0j)– ¡ 2Z–)], where C>0( s e ef o o t n o t e2 6 ) . S i n c e@2¢…i
@l2 > 0a n d@¢…i
@l jl= „ RQZ =
C £
(Rh¡R0)(Q¡Z)(Z(2–¡1)¡jy1;0j–)
Q < 0, it follows that @¢…i
@l < 0. Therefore, since ¢…ijl=R0 =0 ,
the player is worse oﬁ by bidding for one unit at l>R 0. This expands trivially to the case of
bidding for up to Z ¡1 units. Suppose now that Z ‚ 1 and consider bids by Player i for Q0 ‚ Z
units. Note ﬂrst that it is not proﬂtable to bid for Q0 • Q ¡ zi;0 units, since there will be no
short squeezing at all when l>L . Suppose therefore that Player i bids for Q0 2 [Q¡(zi;0¡1);Q]
units. Then his expected excess payoﬁ is at most:25
¢…i =[ ( Q0 ¡ Q + zi;0)Rh +(Q ¡ zi;0)R0 + yi;0R0 ¡ Q0l ¡ yi;0R0
¡yi;0–(Rh ¡ R0)]Prfl>L>S g
+[(Q0 ¡ Q + zi;0)Rh +(Q ¡ zi;0)R0 ¡ Q0l + yi;0R0 ¡ yi;0R0]Prfl>S>L g
+[(Q ¡ Z)(R0 ¡ l)+yi;0R0 ¡ yi;0R0]PrfS>l>L g
=[ ( Q0 ¡ Q + zi;0)Rh +(Q ¡ zi;0)R0 ¡ Q0l]F(l)G(l;–))




T h el a s tt e r mi sa l w a y sn o n p o s i t i v e ,a n dt h es u mo ft h eﬂ r s tt w ot e r m si sl e s st h a n￿(zi;0 ¡ Z),
where ￿>0( s i n c eQ0 • Q).26 Therefore Player i is worse oﬁ, since Z>z i;0.A l o n gt h es a m e
lines as in Part (ii), Player i cannot earn a positive excess payoﬁ by splitting his bids.
Final part: That any player without market power cannot beneﬂt from bidding aggressively is
a simple consequence of Proposition 3. Suppose therefore that some Player i 2 M +2;:::;K+1
bids aggressively and that all other longs are passive. As established in Theorem 3, it must be
the aggressive long who submits only one bid. By the same procedure as above, we ﬂnd that
F(S)a n dG(L;–) are given by (16) and (17), respectively, but where Z should be replaced by
zi;0 (this should also be done in the expression for the upper bound of the support). Given these
strategies, suppose now that Player 2 (who has Z>z i;0 units of market power) deviates by
bidding for Q units at a rate l>R 0. Then Player 2’s expected excess payoﬁ is:
¢…2 =[ ZRh +(Q ¡ Z)R0 ¡ Ql]F(l)G(l;–)¡ y2;0–(Rh ¡ R0)
R
[R0;l] F(L)dG(L;–)
+[(Z ¡ zi;0)Rh +(Q ¡ Z)R0 ¡ (Q ¡ zi;0)l]G(l;–)(1 ¡ F(l))
> [ZRh +(Q ¡ Z)R0 ¡ Ql]F(l)G(l;–)+( Q ¡ Z)(R0 ¡ l)G(l;–)(1 ¡ F(l))
¡(jy1;0j¡zi;0)(Rh ¡ R0)F(l)(G(l;–)¡ G(R0;–));
(25)
since (a) (Q ¡ Z)(R0 ¡ l) < (Z ¡ zi;0)Rh +( Q ¡ Z)R0 ¡ (Q ¡ zi;0)l;( b )y2;0 •j y1;0j¡zi;0;
(c)
R
[R0;l] F(L)dG(L;–) <F(l)[G(l;–)¡ G(R0;–)] (the latter is true since F(L) is monotonically
increasing); and (d) – • 1. Thus, by direct substitution of F(L)a n dG(L;–) in the right hand
side of (25) we get
(l ¡ R0)(Rh ¡ R0)(Q(zi;0(– ¡ 1) ¡j y1;0j–)+z2
i;0)
Q(Rh ¡ L)(Lzi;0 + R0(jy1;0j¡zi;0)– + Rh(zi;0(– ¡ 1) ¡j y1;0j–))
£
•
(l ¡ R0)(Q ¡ zi;0)(jy1;0j¡zi;0)
jy1;0j
+




25It is less in the event that l>L>Sand X =2 .
26￿ =
(l¡R0)(Rh¡R0)2(Q¡Z)(Q(jy1;0j–¡Z(–¡1))¡Z2)
Q(Rh¡l)Z(LZ+R0(jy1;0j¡Z)–+Rh(Z(–¡1)¡jy1;0j–)) > 0. C =
(Rh¡R0)2(Q(jy1;0j–¡Z(–¡1))¡Z2)
Q(Rh¡L)(LZ+R0(jy1;0j¡Z)–+Rh(Z(–¡1)¡jy1;0j–))2 > 0.
29The ﬂrst factor is negative 8 l.M o r e o v e r ,9 †>0, small enough, so when l = R0 +†, the second
factor is always negative (since the ﬂrst fraction is always positive and equal to 0 at l = R0,a n d
the second fraction is always negative). Hence, there is no equilibrium in which any one of the
non-largest longs is aggressive with all other longs being passive. 2
Proof of Theorem 6
(i) Follows directly from Q<Z. (ii) That there is a squeeze for sure implies: (1) Player 1 values
each of the Q units in the auction at Rh; and (2) for every auctioned unit and for any allocation
of the Q ¡ 1 other units, at least one of the long players value the unit at Rh. Competition in
the auction then implies that every unit will be sold for Rh. 2
Proof of Proposition 4
The proposition follows from inspection of the strategies described in Theorems 4 and 5. 2
Proof of Proposition 5
First order stochastic dominance is obvious from inspection of F(S)a n dG(L;–). 2
Proof of Proposition 6
The proposition follows from inspection of the derivative of G(L;–)w i t hr e s p e c tt o–. 2
Proof of Proposition 7
We will consider the case q⁄
1;2 = Q ¡ Z. It is obvious that this will minimize the expected mean
bid of the short player. Let mi stand for the quantity-weighted mean bid of the bidder i.T h e






(SZ +( Q ¡ Z)R0)dF(S)=R0 +( Rh ¡R0)
‡

















where ˆ = Z(1 ¡ –)+jy1;0j–. Direct calculation shows that




(Q ¡ Z)Z ln(
Q
Q ¡ Z





For N = 2, Theorem 2 shows that q⁄
1;2 = Q ¡ Z. Since in this case jy1;0j = Z, expectations





Qˆ¡Z2) < 0: The inequality follows from the fact that @2‚
@ˆ2 = Z4
ˆ¡Z2 > 0, limˆ!1
@‚
@ˆ =0 ,
and 9ˆ such that @2‚
ˆ < 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 8












Q2 < 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 9
If N =2 ,q⁄



















Q2(R0 ¡ Rh)2(Q ¡ Z)’;
30where ’ · Z(Z ¡2Q)+2Q(Q¡Z)ln
Q
Q¡Z:To establish the proposition, it su–ces to show that
’<0. Now,
@’(Q;Z)





Z¡Q < 0. Since
@’(Q;Z)
@Q jZ=0 =0 ,t h i s
implies that
@’(Q;Z)
@Q < 0. Hence, since ’(Q;Z)jZ=0 =0 ,w eh a v e’(Q;Z) < 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 10










Since ln(1 + x) • x ¡ x2
2 + x3
3 , we may get an upper bound on (26) by substituting the above







6(Q ¡ Z)3ˆ3Q2(jy1;0j¡Z)2–2 £ [a1Q3 + o(Q2)]; (27)
where a1 = ¡(1 ¡ –)Z(Z +2 jy1;0j–)¡ Z2–2 < 0. Clearly 9 „ Q such that 8 Q> „ Q this expression
is negative, which is su–cient to establish Part (i). The limiting result follows from the result
that for N>2a n d–>0, lim–!0+ £=Z=2Q. The proof of part (ii) goes along the same lines.
Part (iii): Proceeding as in Part (i), we get an upper bound on @£












@jy1;0j dL < 0, since the integrand is less than zero for any L 2
(R0; „ RQZ]. Part (v): Use L’Hospital’s rule. 2
Proof of Proposition 11
The expected equilibrium payoﬁs to the short and the aggressive long can be calculated as in the
p r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 ,w h i c hd e a l sw i t hN = 2, using (22) and (13), respectively. Consider next
the \passive" Player i, i= 2f 1;ng.P l a y e ri gets a payoﬁ of yi;0(R0+–(Rh¡R0)) in the event of a
short squeeze (probability £) and yi;0R0 in the event of no squeeze. Hence, E[…i]i sa ss t a t e di n
the proposition. Finally, note that the total payoﬁ always equals (Q +
PN
i=1 yi;0)R0.T h e r e f o r e
the expected interest earnings of the auctioneer can be calculated by subtracting the payoﬁs of
all other players from this expression and using the deﬂnition of Z. 2
Proof of Proposition 12
Follows from a direct comparison of Proposition 11 and Theorem 4. 2
Proof of Proposition 13
Using Z = jy1;0j¡
P














Since Q>Zand ˆ ‚ Z, the ﬂrst factor is negative and the second is positive. The Proposition
follows. 2
Proof of Proposition 14
As
Q
Z !1 , „ RQZ ! R0 and therefore E[…1] ! y1;0R0 and both F(S)a n dG(S;–)g ot oR0.I t
follows that £ approaches zero, therefore E[…A] ! QR0 and 8iE[…i] ! yi;0R0.F o r –>0t h e
case that
jy1;0j
Z !1follows along the same lines. 2
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